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ABSTRACT 
The Political Economy of Cross-Border Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions 
By 
Joon Gu Koh 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) among corporations are truly stark 
phenomena in today’s international economy: companies from one country 
acquire or merge with a company of another country. But today’s global 
economy reveals a lopsided distribution of M&As, i.e. some countries are much 
more successful in attracting cross-border M&As thereby achieving a better 
outcome in the development of cross-border corporate M&A market, while 
others are less successful or unsuccessful. This study questions what leads to 
successful development of cross-border M&A markets. The study applies a 
mixed method of statistical analysis and comparative case studies. The 
statistical analysis, which used a panel data of 167 countries between 2002 and 
2012, results in emphasizing the role of the degree of democracy in the 
development of cross-border corporate M&A markets. The case studies look 
into Korea and Japan to examine what the ‘real-world’ examples say about the 
outcome of statistical analysis. The qualitative study corroborates the 
statistical findings. 
 
 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION…………………………..………………………………………..p.1 
Key Terms……...……………………………………………...……………..p. 4 
LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………………………….…p. 11 
HYPOTHESES………………………………………………………………...…..p. 41 
METHOD AND DATA……………………………………………………………p. 45 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS……………………………………..………………..p. 49 
CASE STUDIES……………..…………………………………………………….p. 53 
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………..…………………p. 71 
APENDIX………………………………………………………………………..….p. 73 
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………..p. 80 
 
1 
 
Part One. Introduction 
Marriage is often considered to be among the most crucial events for people’s 
lives, because a “good” marriage can create synergy for the lives of both the 
bride and the bridegroom. Likewise, a “bad” marriage can shove the couple into 
a whirlpool of despair which often concludes with divorce. Same idea holds in 
the corporate world: a good marriage between two companies can lead to a 
bigger success, i.e. a “win-win” for both companies. But it can also lead to a 
nightmare – a breakdown. For both cases, what determines the success of 
marriage or M&A is not difficult to understand. It is nevertheless yet unclear 
as to what exactly are the determinants of M&A, i.e. what contributes to the 
establishment of the M&A market, or expanding the volume of M&A activities, 
yet remains an unanswered question. 
It is in this vein which this paper embarks from: this study endeavors to 
explore the political economy of the development of cross-border corporate 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) market. Specifically, the study attempts to 
understand what political factors contributes to a successful, or less 
unsuccessful, development of cross-border M&A markets.1 This is my central 
research question. The topic intrigues the scholars of the international political 
economy (IPE) in various dimensions. Among many, the one that makes this 
topic intellectually intriguing is the depth of exploration. That is, the literature 
                                                          
1 See p. 5 for the definition of cross-border M&A markets. Also, this study defines the “success” 
of the development of cross-border M&A markets as the increase of investment inflows in 
cross-border M&As. 
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has investigated widely and deeply on financial development and cross-border 
corporate M&As, and their various aspects. Conversely, the literature has thus 
far not yet covered the topic of this study in commensurate depth and breadth, 
thus encouraging further exploitation. 
Notwithstanding, the literature reveals propensities toward certain 
topics, a status in which the topic of this research is left underexploited: first, 
the economics literature offers a massive volume of studies on the development 
of financial system. For example, thanks to the pioneering contribution by 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), the economics literature has paved its road 
to the inquiries on the relationship between the financial development and 
economic growth, i.e. whether financial development contributes to growth, 
and if so how. Second, the business administration literature offers a great 
depth and breadth in the studies of cross-border M&A, and explores the effects 
of institutions also in great depth and breadth. But an issue with the literature 
is that it ignores the importance of clarifying what it exactly means by 
“institution”, i.e. the literature largely takes the concept of institution for 
granted without attempts to clarify the definition. 
Despite such propensities, the comparative political economy literature 
offers a well-established volume of scholarly works that reveals some clues 
which help explore the topic of this research – namely the ‘Varieties of 
Capitalism’ (VoC). The VoC literature is mainly interested in competitiveness 
at different levels, e.g. firm, industry, and the national economy. And the 
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literature puts the firm at the center of inquiry and posits a relational view, 
i.e. the VoC posits that “a firm encounters many coordination problems because 
its capabilities are ultimately relational” (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The VoC, 
based on this and other assumptions 2 , yields a dichotomy in capitalist 
economies that is widely applied in ensuing works. In spite of its wide 
application in studying the capitalist economies its central limitation would be 
the scope: the VoC literature is concerned primarily with the developed 
economies, U.S., U.K, France, Germany, etc. This constrains scholarly efforts 
to apply the dichotomous concepts to wider pool of economies, e.g. 
underdeveloped and developing countries. 
With regard to research method, this study adopts a mixed approach 
that consists of quantitative and qualitative analyses, and is organized as 
follows: next section defines the key terms, followed by a literature review so 
as to generate hypotheses, all of which will be presented in the following 
section. The study then tests the hypotheses in statistical analysis. The 
following section presents comparative case studies on a pair of East Asian 
economies – the Republic of Korea and Japan - to investigate what the real-
world case examples say about what the quantitative analysis has yied. The 
study then discusses the outcome and concludes. 
                                                          
2 Hall and Soskice (2001) emphasize the role of institutions in capitalist economies as the 
provider of “capacities for the exchange of information, monitoring, and the sanctioning of 
defections relevant to cooperative behavior among firms and other actors” (p. 10). 
4 
 
1.2. Key Terms 
Merger and Acquisition (M&A) refers to the consolidation of companies. A 
merger is “a combination of two companies to form a new company", while an 
acquisition is "the purchase of one company by another in which no new 
company is formed."3 In this regard, the cross-border corporate M&As refer to 
the cases in which a company, or an investor, located in one country takes over 
or merges with a company in another country.4 M&As take place for various 
reasons: companies acquire other companies to expand their business portfolio, 
obtain certain expertise or technologies as well as patents, or to make inroads 
into foreign markets. Sometimes the key motivation of corporate M&As is truly 
financial, i.e. companies acquire other companies to make profit. In this sense, 
the financial world often discern the acquirers in two categories – the strategic 
investors (SIs) and the financial investors (FIs). The motivation behind the 
seller’s side is largely twofold – as part of routine business strategy or as part 
of their survival attempts. The former pertains to the cases in which companies 
try to restructure their business portfolio so as to improve the overall efficiency 
of their business. The latter to the cases in which companies try to get rid of 
                                                          
3  Quotes are cited from http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mergersandacquisitions.asp 
(accessed 11:53am on Saturday, April 25, 2015) 
4 Whether or not a M&A transaction is a "cross-border" one is determined by the location of 
the two parties involved, i.e. the acquirer and the target firm. That is, the examples of cross-
border M&As can range from a case in which Citigroup taking over the entire stake of Seoul’s 
KorAm Bank in 2004, to a case in which an American corporation headquartered in New York 
City acquiring the controlling share of a subsidiary of U.S.-based multinational corporation 
located in Shanghai, China. 
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the “troublemakers”, i.e. a subsidiary or a business unit that yields poor 
profitability. 
Financial Market refers to a venue wherein buyers and sellers come together 
to conduct trades in assets and financial products, e.g. stocks, bonds, currencies, 
and derivatives. Financial markets are “typically defined by having 
transparent pricing, basic regulations on trading, costs and fees and market 
forces determining the prices of securities that trade.”5 Examples of financial 
markets include the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, and Seoul’s foreign exchange (forex or FX) market. Likewise, M&A 
market refers to a market place wherein the purchase and the sale of a 
controlling share of companies, or subsidiaries, are conducted. Particularly, 
cross-border M&A market refers to an arena wherein the investor(s) from one 
country acquires or merges a company from another country. 
Economic Openness, often called current account openness, refers to the 
degree to which market economy operates free from various restrictions on 
international trade. The concept is often measured in terms of the level of trade 
barriers or the proportion of exports and imports in a country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP). In essence, the degree of economic openness is determined by 
the level of regulation imposed by the government. In turn, the level of 
                                                          
5 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financial-market.asp (Accessed 2:14pm PST, Tuesday 
May 18, 2016) 
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economic openness determines how much room governments can have in its 
choice of economic policies they pursue.  
Financial Openness refers to the degree to which capital can freely move in 
and out of a country's financial markets. Thus, the major policy tools for 
governments to regulate their financial markets are the tax and legal 
framework: governments often make it tough for the multinational investors 
to repatriate their profits by levying a repatriation tax, which is often levied in 
addition to the capital gains tax. Also, governments often demand certain 
qualifications to be eligible to invest in their home markets, for instance, 
capital adequacy ratio, business portfolio, past history on foreign investment, 
the firm type (e.g. deposit-taking institution, non-banking financial 
institutions, private equity firm, hedge fund, or sovereign wealth fund), etc. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) refers to one class of investment made in 
one country by a company or other entities based in another country. FDIs are 
made in many different forms – from establishment of a local branch or 
subsidiary directly by the foreign entity to joint venture and M&As – and are 
in contrast with portfolio investment. That is, while foreign portfolio 
investment is carried out by purchasing a debt or acquiring a portion of shares 
of companies listed in overseas stock markets, FDIs are made when the 
investor does one of the following: set up a subsidiary in the host country, 
acquire sufficient shares to exercise a degree of control (usually ten percent or 
more of voting shares or ordinary shares) of a company, launch a joint venture, 
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or do M&As. Examples of FDI would include General Motors’s joint venture in 
China, namely Shanghai GM, and Standard Chartered Group's acquisition of 
Korea First Bank in Seoul to launch Standard Chartered Bank, Korea in 2005.6 
Financial Liberalization, at its simplest, refers to the opening of a country's 
financial markets. Financial liberalization opens the door to not only 
multinational investments, but also various financial technologies, financial 
products, and business practices of financial institutions, all of which can lead 
to financial innovation, i.e. the occasions in which financial institutions create 
new forms of financial instruments and techniques that had not been 
previously used. Financial liberalization is associated with financial 
deregulation, in that the latter refers to the alleviation of the restriction on, for 
example, interest rates and credit allocation. 
Financial Institutions (FIs) are the establishments that deal with financial 
transactions, e.g. deposit and loan, investment, securities trading, trust, 
underwriting, and trade finance. FIs can be categorized in two types depending 
on the eligibility to accept deposits – deposit-taking institutions and non-
banking financial institutions (NBFIs). The examples of the former category 
are commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and credit unions. The latter 
                                                          
6  Standard Chartered Group is a London, U.K.-based international banking institution 
operating mostly in Southeast Asia, Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The British bank 
acquired the entire share of Korea First Bank, in 2005, from New Bridge Capital - a San 
Francisco, California-based private equity fund (PEF). New Bridge was established in 1994 as 
a joint venture by three PEFs - Texas Pacific Group, Blum Capital, and ACON Investment - 
to focus on leveraged buyouts in emerging markets. 
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would include securities firm, insurance companies, private equity fund, and 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). 
Hedge Funds are “alternative investments using pooled funds that may use 
a number of different strategies in order to earn active return on investment 
(ROI), or alpha 7 , for their investors.” 8  Hedge funds may be “aggressively 
managed or make use of derivatives and leverage in both domestic and 
international markets with the goal of generating high returns (either in an 
absolute sense or over a specified market benchmark).” 9  In M&A market, 
hedge funds usually acquire majority shares to control the firm, i.e. thirty 
percent or more, thereby enabling them to turn around the acquired firm in 
ways which makes the sales of those acquired firms more marketable. 
Private Equity Funds (PEFs) are similar to hedge funds. But what 
separates the former from the latter is the source of funds: while hedge funds 
collect funds from various sources, PEFs raise funds from equity capital, i.e. 
                                                          
7 "Alpha" is an indicator measuring the "active ROI", i.e. the performance of a particular 
investment compared to a relevant market index, e.g. Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) or 
S&P500. In this sense, an alpha of 1.0 means that the investment, of which alpha is measuring, 
has outperformed its benchmark index by a percent over a particular period of time. Likewise, 
an alpha of -1.0 means that that investment has underperformed its benchmark index by one 
percent during a certain period of time. Another index that the investors pays a great deal of 
attention to, along with alpha, is "Beta". Simply put, beta tells the investors about the tendency 
of a security's returns to respond to the ups and downs in the market, and is an index 
measuring the volatility of particular investment also in comparison with a benchmark, e.g. 
S&P500, like alpha. Beta equals the monthly returns over the specified comparison period. So 
if the beta of a stock listed at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is 1.5, then theoretically 
it means that the stock is fifty percent more volatile than the market - NYSE. 
8 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedgefund.asp (accessed on 4:50pm, Thursday, March 
24, 2016) 
9 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedgefund.asp (accessed on 4:50pm, Thursday, March, 
24, 2016) 
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capital not quoted on a public exchange. In this regard, the majority of the 
investors in PEFs consists of various institutional investors, investment banks, 
SWFs, pension funds, and asset management firms, all of whom can provide a 
large sum of money for a relatively long period of time. On this note, the PEFs 
often make a long-term investments to generate profit from turnaround and 
re-sale or initial public offering (IPO), i.e. acquire a distressed company and 
turnaround over a number of years so as to be able to sell the company to other 
investors (often publicly listed ones) or to mass public through IPO. 
Investment Bank (IB) is a financial institution that provides various services 
in a specialized area. IBs usually specialize in complex financial transaction 
that are financial technology-intensive, e.g. underwriting, asset securitization, 
advising and managing M&A deals, managing IPOs, and intermediating stock-
issuing companies and individual investors. 
Leveraged Buyout (LBO) is, put simply, the acquisition of a company with 
a loan. In other words, LBO refers to the transactions in which an entity buys 
a company by using a considerable amount of borrowed money to cover the cost 
of the transaction. In many cases of LBO, the assets owned by the target 
company is provided as collateral along with the acquirer’s assets. The central 
purpose of conducting LBO is allowing the companies to acquire other 
companies without having to commit a large sum of capital. While favored by 
the acquiring company for its convenience, the LBO is often criticized for moral 
10 
 
reasons. That is, the LBO often entails the possibility to leave the acquired 
company with an empty shell as its assets can be collateralized. 
Stock and Flows are among the ways to measure the cross-border M&As. 
First of all, the stocks of cross-border M&A measure the aggregate level of 
cross-border M&A “at a given point in time, usually the end of a quarter or of 
a year.” On the contrary, financial flows “consist of equity transactions, 
reinvestment of earnings, and intercompany debt transactions.” Cross-border 
M&A flows, accordingly, record the value of international transactions “related 
to direct investment during a given period time, usually a quarter or a year”, 
according the OECD.10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 https://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi-stocks.htm (Accessed 2:18pm PST, Tuesday, May 18, 2016) 
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Part Two. Literature Review 
The central question this study aims to answer concerns the political 
economic determinants of success of the development of cross-border M&A 
market. That is, the key question addresses what contributes to the 
development of the market for international corporate M&As. In so doing, this 
study looks at different sets of relevant literature to the topic of this study. The 
central goal of this literature review is to derive testable hypotheses. 
The literature in economics and political science keep its focus rather 
broad, i.e. on the development of the financial system as a whole, and explore 
the relationship between financial development and various economic and 
political factors. Management studies, on the other hand, focus on the firm- or 
market / industry-level studies of cross-border M&As, e.g. factors affecting 
cross-border corporate acquisitions, cross-border bank M&As and risk, cross-
border M&As as instruments of comparative advantage, and role of investment 
banking in developing countries. 
In this light, each set of literature serves a unique function for this study. 
Specifically, the financial development literature, which pertains to economics, 
provides the theoretical background which sets the theoretical parameters, 
though largely, of this study. In particular, the literature offers a cornerstone 
for our theoretical understanding of the dependent variable - the development 
of corporate M&A sector. Put together, the financial development literature 
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would serve this study as one of central theoretical platform, if not the central 
theorical platform.  
Second, the M&A literature, which pertains to business studies and 
specifically the finance realm of the discipline, also has to do with the 
dependent variable. In detail, the literature not only offers affluent knowledge 
for understanding M&A, but at least equally importantly, the literature will 
reveal that it has been overlooking the political aspects of cross-border M&As, 
a factor which adds to the importance of the topic of this research, as well as 
to justifying why this research topic is interesting. In sum, each literature has 
its own focus, but none of the literature alone suffices to help us understand 
the topic of this proposed project. That is, one can hope to create the foundation 
for this study only when we bring both literatures together with the 
comparative political economy literature. 
Lastly, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature serves as the 
foundation of possible independent variables, particularly the explanatory 
variables of political domain. As discussed later and as Hall and Soskice (2001) 
stipulated, the literature strongly implies that each type of different capitalist 
economies has its own institutional features, and those unique features 
produce distinctive consequences that are not observed in other types of 
capitalist economy. On this note, Hall and Soskice (2001) define markets as 
the "institutions that support relationships of particular types, marked by 
arm's length relations and high levels of competition", and add that "[a]ll 
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capitalist economies also contain the hierarchies that firms construct to resolve 
the problems that cannot be addressed by markets" (p. 9). Also, a brief review 
of political institution literature will be added to supplement the delineation of 
basic concepts and themes. The literature is reviewed mainly to make up for 
the deficiency in the management literature’s efforts to clarify what exactly is 
meant by the term “institution.” 
2.1. Financial Development 
At its simplest, financial development is the development of financial 
markets in a national economy.  This topic has been intensively explored by 
the economics discipline, and the literature reveals that economists are most 
interested in, among many plausible research topics, the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth and the political economy of 
financial development.  That is, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
financial development literature has been devoting its attention heavily to the 
two aforementioned topics, and thus has relatively overlooked other research 
topics including the one this research strives to explore.  
The root of the financial development literature dates back to 1934: a 
theoretical work by Joseph Schumpeter - The Theory of Economic Development 
- has provided the underlying foundation for the vast majority of the financial 
development literature that followed, mainly because this book provided the 
most basic conceptual framework. For example, Schumpeter defined capital as 
"the sum of means of payment which is available at any moment for 
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transference to entrepreneurs", and suggested that capital works as the "lever 
by which the entrepreneur subjects to his control the concrete goods which he 
needs, a means of diverting the factors of production to new uses, or of dictating 
a new direction to production" (p. 116). Equally important, Schumpeter 
asserted that "credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the 
purpose of transferring it to the entrepreneur, but not simply the transfer of 
existing purchasing power" (p. 107).  So the creation of purchasing power 
"characterizes, in principle, the method by which development is carried out in 
a system with private property and division of labor" (p. 107).  
An immense volume of studies of financial development was conducted 
in the following decades, and in recent years several works have gained 
importance. A foundational framework is found in a 1997 study by Ross Levine. 
In this seminal article, Levine attempts to summarize the literature on 
financial development and growth. Among his central findings is that the 
preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a 
positive effect of financial development on growth. In this article, Levine offers 
a functional approach to understanding the operation of the financial system. 
According to Levine, the financial system has five key roles: first, facilitation 
of trading, hedging, diversifying, and risk-pooling; second, resource allocation; 
third, monitoring the management of corporations and controlling corporations; 
fourth, savings mobilization; and fifth, facilitation of the exchange of goods and 
services. These key roles form the parameters within the scholarly debates on 
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financial development, according to Levine. On this note, Levine suggests that 
two research questions to come to be borne at the center of scholarly attention: 
first, the links between the functioning of the financial system and economic 
growth, capital accumulation, and technological change, and second, the ties 
between financial structure (i.e. the mix of financial markets and 
intermediaries) and the functioning of the financial system.  
Another seminal work in the studies of financial development had been 
published by the two economists then at the University of Chicago - Raghuram 
Rajan and Luigi Zingales. Rajan and Zingales (2003a) proposed a theoretical 
framework which introduces a political economy approach to the development 
of financial markets - namely an "interest group theory of financial 
development." The key proposition of the theory is that the incumbents of the 
financial system oppose financial development because it breeds competition. 
The theory predicts that incumbents' opposition will be weaker when an 
economy allows both cross-border trade and capital flows. In this vein, Rajan 
and Zingales explain that, first, the incumbents not only enjoy some rents in 
the markets they operate but they also end up appropriating most of the 
returns from new ventures, second, that these rents will be impaired by 
financial development, because better disclosure rules and enforcement in a 
developed financial market will reduce the relative importance of incumbents' 
collateral and reputation, while permitting newcomers to enter and compete 
away profits. 
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The explanation continues: third, the key to the ability to lend is the 
relationships with those who have influence over the firm and the ability to 
monopolize the provision of finance to a client. The authors thus conclude that 
a more efficient financial system facilitates entry into the sector, thus leads to 
lower profits for incumbent firms and financial institutions, and this would 
imply that, collectively the incumbents have a vested interest in preventing 
financial development. Here, what is critical is that financial development 
facilitates the entrance of new firms, thus increasing competition among the 
incumbents and the new entrants. Finally, Rajan and Zingales emphasize the 
necessity of government intervention in financial markets, as several 
components of financial system become essential when countries embark on 
financial development. Those essentials are, first, respect for property rights, 
second, an accounting and disclosure system that promotes transparency, third, 
a legal system that enforces arm's length contracts cheaply, and fourth, a 
regulatory infrastructure that protects consumers, promotes competition, and 
controls egregious risk-taking. 
As noted earlier, the economics literature has intensively explored the 
political economy of financial development. Though the majority of studies are 
empirical, they offer some valuable leeway to predict the possible answers to 
the research question of this study. Girma and Shortland (2008) studied the 
effects of a country's democracy characteristics and regime change on financial 
development.  Using panel data from both developed and developing economies 
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between 1975 and 2000, they found that democratic transition and stable 
democracy have positive effects on subsequent financial development. Braun 
and Raddatz (2008) attempted to explore why some countries achieved more 
financial development than others, and their empirical test yielded a notable 
outcome - that the promotion of trade liberalization supports financial 
development. 
One of the most salient topics in this strand of literature is the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. Numerous 
scholars have delved into this topic, and so far hold that financial development 
certainly does contribute to growth. Specifically, studies have shown that 
several aspects of financial development provide positive effect on economic 
growth, particularly on total factor productivity growth and rates of factor 
accumulation (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Gregorio and Guidotti, 1993). 
Despite their acknowledgement of the positive effect of financial development 
on economic growth, Gregorio and Guidotti (1993) emphasize the role of proper 
management (or regulation) of the financial system. They claim that, based on 
the Latin American experience of 1970s and 80s, cases can be made that 
“unregulated financial liberalization and expectations of government bailouts 
can lead to a negative relationship between the degree of financial 
intermediation and growth.” Gregorio and Guidotti added that the central 
medium through which financial development leads to growth is the effect on 
the efficiency of investment, not its level. 
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On a similar note, Shen and Lee (2006) delved into the causal 
relationship between financial development and economic growth. From their 
empirical studies of forty-eight countries between 1976 and 2001, they found 
that only stock market development has a positive effect on the growth of real 
GDP per capita. Also, the study discovered that the conditional variables, e.g. 
financial liberalization, high-income level, and good shareholder protection 
mitigate the negative impact of banking development on growth, as well as 
that the progress in stock market development facilitated economic growth in 
many parts of the developing world, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
East Asia. 
This review of financial development literature suggests what the 
literature can offer for this study: the literature provides a ground that sets 
the parameters of the theoretical origin of this research. But more importantly, 
the literature offers a theoretical foundation for the dependent variable - the 
development of cross-border M&A sector. This is because the debates and 
studies in this particular literature looks into the financial system as a whole, 
a unit which subsumes the corporate M&A sector. This, in turn, enables this 
study to apply findings to the financial development theories to understand the 
development of a domain of a more specific category – the cross-border 
corporate M&A sector. 
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2.2. Cross-Border M&As 
The management studies literature provides an enormous volume of 
scholarly works on cross-border corporate mergers and acquisitions. Research 
topics explored in the literature seem much diffused. In short, the literature 
reveals an enormously wide array of issues, for example, some studies examine 
the international and regional perspectives of cross-border corporate M&As, 
and some studies look at various types of M&A markets. Also, some theoretical 
studies have looked at where the gains from M&As come from, and at why 
corporations pursue M&As. So this study walks through some of the very basic 
but relevant pieces which cover the theoretical foundation of this research 
project.  
One of the most extensively exploited topics in the M&A literature 
delves into the key driving force of cross-border M&As. A study by Di Giovanni 
(2005) looked at the key roles of macroeconomic and financial variables in the 
multinational corporation's (MNC) decision for cross-border M&As. His 
empirical study, using a panel data of cross-border M&As between 1990 and 
1999, revealed that financial variables and institutional factors play a 
considerable role in cross-border M&A. More specifically Di Giovanni 
discovered that the size of financial markets yields a strong positive effect on 
a firm's decision to do M&A abroad, e.g. "a 1% increase of the stock market to 
GDP ratio is associated with a 0.955% increase in cross-border M&A activity" 
(p. 145). 
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With regard to the key driving forces of cross-border M&As, Jongwanich 
et al. (2013) suggest five motives behind cross-border M&As. First, a search for 
strategic natural resources: some corporations, mostly manufacturers, are 
consistently distressed by the amount of national resources at hand. For these 
companies the prime motive is to secure sufficient amount of natural resources 
so as to enhance the stability of input for their production. Second is market 
access opportunity or expansion. Dramatic increase in the presence of MNCs 
in China is a clear example: as China put an end to its long hibernation when 
Deng Xiaoping launched "Reform and Open-Door" economic policies in 1978, 
MNCs flooded into China for export market. And this influx of the FDI widened 
the horizon of foreign capital’s business in China to targeting a domestic 
market of 1.3 billion people. 
Third, Jongwanich et al. (2013) suggest that MNCs aim at the 
enhancement of efficiency of their operation through cross-border M&As. This 
is particularly true when we look at the cases in which MNCs from developed 
economies, e.g. U.K. and U.S., or western Europe, acquire or establish 
companies in underdeveloped countries where factors of production, especially 
labor, are cheap and abundant. Fourth, MNCs do cross-border M&As to grasp 
the opportunity to acquire assets, so that they can maintain their competitive 
position in the markets where they operate. Fifth and lastly, Jongwanich et al. 
claim that a "financially deep market provides firms access to the capital 
necessary to undertake cross-border investment." Thus, they continue that 
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"financial deepening, both in terms of size and liquidity, within a country is 
crucial in aiding its firms to raise in their home country for investment abroad" 
(p. 268). 
2.3. Varieties of Capitalism 
One other literature relevant to this topic lies in the comparative 
political economy (CPE), which provides an insightful set of knowledge and 
theory through the so-called "Varieties of Capitalism" (VoC) literature. 
Emerged in late 1990s, the VoC literature has been triggering much academic 
interests in the political economy field, largely owing to a seminal work by 
Soskice and Hall (2001). In this book, the two authors offer a new framework 
for understanding the institutional features of different types of capitalist 
economies – the two main types are what Hall and Soskice call liberal market 
economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). 
LME is a type of capitalist economies in which all necessary coordination 
for firms is done through the basic market mechanism. Hall and Soskice (2001) 
explain that in LMEs “firms rely more heavily on market relations to resolve 
the coordination problems11 that firms in CMEs address more often via forms 
of non-market coordination that entail collaboration and strategic interaction” 
                                                          
11 Hall and Soskice (2001) assume that firms are relational entities. That is, they see firms as 
“actors seeking to develop and exploit core competencies or dynamic capabilities understood 
as capacities for developing, producing, and distributing goods and services profitably” (p. 6). 
In this light, the two scholars posit that forms face a wide range of coordination problems 
because the capabilities of a firm is relational, thus that the success of a firm “depends 
substantially on its ability to coordinate effectively with a wide range of actors” (p. 6). 
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(p. 27). Thus the degree of institutional support for non-market forms of 
coordination is lower in LMEs than in CMEs. In LMEs, market relationships 
are characterized by “the arm’s-length exchange of goods or services in a 
context of competition and formal contracting” (p. 8). The United States is a 
major example of this category. 
CMEs, on the other hand, rely more on “non-market relationships to 
coordinate their endeavors with other actors and to construct their core 
competencies.” So these mode of “non-market coordination generally entail 
more extensive relational or incomplete contracting, network monitoring based 
on the exchange of private information inside networks, and more reliance on 
collaborative, as opposed to competitive, relationships to build the 
competencies of the firm” according to the two scholars (2001, p. 8). Germany 
is a prime example. What is perhaps most striking about Hall and Soskice's 
work is that it creatively departs from the state-centric view and puts the firm 
at the heart of their research. That is, the two authors take the firm, not the 
state, as the basic unit of analysis and posit firms to be a "relational" entity in 
the national economy so that they can take a deeper look at how different 
capitalist market economies are operated at a "hands-on" level. Hall and 
Soskice argue that "because its capabilities are ultimately relational, a firm 
encounters many coordination problems" (p. 6). 
Their work is also accredited for its ambition to embrace a multi-
disciplinary approach to studying market economies, as noted clearly in the 
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authors' comment: they assert that they "hope to build bridges between 
business studies and comparative political economy, two disciplines that are 
all too often disconnected" (p. 5), and also that "[b]y integrating game-
theoretical perspectives on the firm of the sort that are now central to 
microeconomics into an analysis of the macro-economy, we attempt to connect 
the new microeconomics to important issues in macroeconomics" (p. 5). 
Hall and Soskice's work focuses on examining capitalist economies in 
terms of five different criteria: first, industrial relations and wages and 
productivity, i.e. how wages are determined, second, vocational training and 
education, third, corporate governance, particularly returns of investment, 
fourth, inter-firm relations, i.e. do firms compete with other companies in their 
industry or do they rather collaborate?, and fifth, relations with employees, i.e. 
what is the relationship between the management and the employees of a firm, 
is it adversarial or cooperative? LMEs largely resort to the basic free-market 
mechanism in solving the aforementioned issues while CMEs approach the 
issues more strategically. In other words, LMEs are prone to tackle the issues 
in a so-called laissez-faire manner, leaving the issues to the "invisible hand", 
whereas the CMEs approach by trying to coordinate different interests of 
various parties involved. 
Numerous academic efforts have been made following Hall and Soskice 
(2001) to further scholarly understanding of capitalist market economies, and 
among them is an attempt to study how market economies change over time 
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as institution. Hall and Thelen (2009) have attempted to develop an approach 
to institutional change that is extended from the one provided in Hall and 
Soskice (2001). Several propositions of Hall and Thelen are worth noting: first, 
institutional stability as a political problem; and second, institutional change 
in the political economy. 
To begin, Hall and Thelen (2009) argue that institutional stability is a 
political issue. They believe that the employer’s interests should be at the 
center of analysis, and this underscores a critical assumption - namely that the 
institutions and practices of capitalist political economies can rarely be 
sustained over time without the active support of at least some powerful 
segments of capital. In addition, the authors note that the VoC framework 
holds that, in a more active process in which entrepreneurial actors seek to 
advance their interests, including in contexts of strategic interaction, 
institutions can improve the well-being of those who participate in them by 
resolving collective action dilemmas. This leads the authors to claim that 
institutional stability of capitalist market economies is surrounded by politics, 
and that attaining coordination amongst various related-entities is a political 
problem since the two types in the original VoC literature - LMEs and CMEs - 
are categorized based on how inter-firm coordination is implemented. 
Another thing to note in Hall and Thelen's work relates to institutional 
change in the political economy of market economies. The assumption here is 
that the existing institutions are bound to come under pressure because 
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market economies are full of entrepreneurial actors interested in improving 
their positions, and the issue would be what precipitates change, which actors 
are central to it, how will it occur, and how should we interpret the results? 
That said, Hall and Thelen believe that the impetus for institutional change, 
at least in the cases of advanced European economies, had been 
"unanticipated" effects flowing from existing institutions, i.e. the institutional 
change was not entirely a series of responses to external shocks.  
On this note, the authors approach institutional change in capitalist 
market economies as the politics of coordination, i.e. inheriting and furthering 
the stance Hall and Soskice took. For Hall and Thelen, specific types of 
coordination (whether market or strategic) can be sustained throughout many 
changes in the formal institutional infrastructure governing a political 
economy, and one of the routes to institutional change that is often under-
investigated is “reinterpretation.” That is, the actors associated with an 
institution gradually change their interpretation of its rules, and thus its 
practices, without defecting from or dismantling the formal institution itself. 
In sum, Hall and Thelen argue that, first, even when institutions are 
Pareto-improving in the context of strategic interaction, their stability should 
not be taken for granted because it rests on a highly political process of 
mobilization marked by conflict and experimentation through which 
informational issues are resolved and distributional issues contested. Second, 
they claim that an institutional "ecology" in which the strategies of the actors 
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are simultaneously conditioned by multiple institutions, and the process of 
institutional change is one of mutual adjustment, inflected by distributive 
concerns, with incremental impacts on the strategies of firms and other actors. 
Also building up from Hall and Soskice, Kathleen Thelen (2009) studied 
how institutional changes are made in LMEs and CMEs, i.e. how the process 
of institutional change has been made in the two categories and what was the 
result. Her central claim is that key political-economic institutions are 
constructed in the context of some historical choice point in the past, and then 
once they are in place, they lay out an enduring logic of political development. 
Thelen adds that several cases suggest that significant institutional change 
often takes place gradually and through a cumulation of seemingly small 
adjustments even in “settled times”, or at least in the absence of some obvious 
historical rupture. 
Thelen's contribution to the VoC literature, I argue, emerges from her 
attempts to diversify CMEs: she categorizes CMEs in terms vocational 
education and training. In detail, she endeavors to categorize CMEs based on 
how firms in CMEs coordinate vocational training: on the one end of Thelen's 
horizon is "solidarist", the firms that have relatively encompassing scope and 
uniform contents in their vocational education and training (e.g. Sweden), and 
on the other is "segmentalist", where training is concentrated in large firms 
and the skills acquired are company specific, i.e. not organized around national 
occupational labor markets, but instead around internal labor markets within 
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firms (e.g. Japan). Thelen explains that the important conceptual point would 
be that "such developments do not 'register' as change on the VoC dimension, 
since they do not represent a breakdown of coordination so much as they do a 
reconfiguration of coordination on less solidaristic terms" (p. 481). 
Empirical efforts have been made to test the aforementioned theoretical 
works in the VoC realm. Hall and Gingerich (2009) tried to test the 
institutional complementarities postulated in the VoC literature, with 
particular focus on labor relations and corporate governance. By the way, Hall 
and Soskice (2001) argue that institutional complementarities suggest that 
"nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of economy should 
tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres as well" (p. 18). Hall 
and Gingerich launched about a dozen of hypotheses regarding the VoC 
literature, and garnered by and large support. For instance, the VoC 
literature's attempts to establish coordination as a critical aspect as well as the 
congruence across the spheres of political economy were both supported. 
Although it seems quite clear that the VoC literature has been 
burgeoning since its emergence at the turn of the millennium, the literature 
has not evolved without criticism. Among many, a set of critiques laid out by 
Mark Blyth (2003) garners much scholarly attention. In a nutshell, Blyth's 
critiques are twofold. First, Blyth points out that Hall and Soskice (2001) fail 
to maintain impartiality in their analysis. In detail, Blyth claims that Hall and 
Soskice implicitly argue for the CMEs and thereby for the egalitarian 
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distributions and outcome typical of European political economies in the face 
of the neo-liberal onslaught.  
More importantly, Blyth questions the authors' understanding of the 
developed economies they studied. That is, he raises an issue regarding the 
possibility that the conventional critique of the European economies is wrong. 
In particular, Blyth questions if Europe’s economic performance was indeed as 
bad as the critics said, and how would the VoC literature have changed if 
Germany were not classified as a CME. Lastly, Blyth questions a conventional 
understanding of the U.S. economy - what if the success of the U.S. economy 
does not come from it being a LME? Despite the fact that Blyth's critiques can 
be seen as rash to some viewers, it seems reasonable to state that Blyth's 
critiques should be recognized as legitimate efforts to contribute to the 
scholarly rigor of the VoC literature. 
All in all, it seems quite clear that the VoC literature has made 
considerable progress over the course of past decade and a half, it has 
maintained its ground principally on the political science discipline, i.e. the 
literature has not yet made significant progress in its interdisciplinary 
approach with other relevant fields, e.g. business administration and 
economics. This is an important part of the central motivation of this project - 
the ambition of building solid bridges between the political economy studies of 
the political science discipline and the finance studies in the business 
administration discipline.  
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On this note, the VoC literature offers this study an important 
foundation for understanding the political dimension of cross-border corporate 
M&As, as noted earlier. That is, the literature suggests that each type of 
capitalist economies has its own institutional features and those features yield 
unique consequences. This, in turn, provides this study with the ground from 
which some meaningful explanatory variables can be extracted, e.g. how the 
basic market mechanism is set up and how institutions function within each 
type of capitalist economies. 
 2.4. Institutions 
Institutions are perhaps one of the most extensively studied topics in 
several academic disciplines, ranging from political science to economics and 
sociology. For example, the economics literature is mainly concerned with 
institutions that constitute markets, while sociology is mainly interested in 
social institutions that govern the lives of individuals and society. Regardless 
of the discipline, the academic literature almost ascertains an idea that 
institutions matter by a great deal for not only economic transactions like 
cross-border-M&As, but more importantly, to every aspect of our daily lives. In 
essence, this is primarily because institutions are “the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction” (North, 1990). Accordingly, institutions shape human 
interaction. When it comes to institution, the international relations (IR) 
discipline suggests several ways to define. Among them are Douglas North’s 
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aforementioned definition, and one by Koremenos et al. (2001): institutions as 
“explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors that prescribe, 
proscribe, and/or authorize behavior.” 
That said, this study constrains its conceptual boundary of institutions 
within the realm of political economy. This section reviews some of the major 
works that shed lights on the central question – the political factors that affect 
the development of international corporate M&A markets. On this note, this 
study limits its focus to institutions in the economic and political arenas. To 
begin with, all economic systems struggle with a fundamental political 
dilemma – confiscation. That is, while strong governments are presumably 
more capable of protecting their citizen’s private ownership of wealth than 
weak governments, their capability also enables them to exert a great level of 
discretion thereby expropriating their citizen’s wealth freely at their will. This 
fundamental dilemma therefore begs a question of what form of political 
system is required.  
Weingast (1995) answers this question by arguing that the answer lies 
in the credible commitment of the state to preserve markets. In other words, 
the political system in countries with thriving markets are well capable of 
limiting future political discretion with respect to the economy that are in the 
interests of political officials to observe. He asserts that the key ingredient of 
“a credible commitment to limited governments is that these limits must be 
self-enforcing” (p. 2), and that “the political foundations of markets are as 
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essential to their success as the details and specification of the market itself” 
(p. 25). 
Despite Weingast’s logical delineation of the role of political institution 
in a national economy, it can still be questionable as to the utility of political 
institution, i.e. what purpose, if any, do political institutions serve. According 
to Terry Moe (1990), political institutions provide two distinctive functions: 
mitigating collective action problem and facilitating coercion and 
redistribution. Moe explains that institutions help solve the issue of 
commitment and enforcement, both of which are debilitating to political 
interactions, thereby encouraging cooperation amongst political actors “in the 
realization of gains from trade” (p. 213). With regard to the facilitation of 
coercion and redistribution, Moe holds that political institutions serve as a 
weapon of coercion and redistribution, in that they determine how political 
winners should pursue their own interests, frequently at the expense of 
political losers. 
These accounts of political institutions are grounded upon a couple of 
basic assumptions. First, politics as an arena in which exchanges are arranged. 
Second, politics as creating and sustaining institutions (March and Olsen, 
1996). The first assumption reflects a view in which individual preferences are 
aggregated into collective actions through negotiation, coalition, and 
exchanges. March and Olsen (1996) explain that, in this view “individual actors 
have prior desires (preferences, interests) which they use to determine the 
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attractiveness of expected consequences”, and that “[c]ollective action depends 
on the negotiation of bargains and side-payments among potential trading 
partners.” The second assumption reflects a constructivist view: actors keep 
their behavior in conformity with socially constructed rules. Here, the key is 
that “life is organized by sets of shared meanings and practices that come to be 
taken as given for a long time”, and also that it is political institutions that set 
the rules and terms and conditions of exchange (March and Olsen, 1996). 
Another important item that has been arduously explored in the 
political institution literature is veto players. In a nutshell, existence and 
influence of the veto players in politics is what produces a critical contrast 
between democracy and non-democracies. That is, the higher the degree of 
vetoes in the political arena the more difficult it is for the incumbent political 
leaders to transform the political status quo to their favor (Tsebelis, 1995). In 
other words, the more veto players in the political arena, the less regulation 
the government can enforce, the less centralization of power, and the less the 
level of state autonomy. Or, borrowing from the concepts of Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. (2003), the more veto players in politics the larger winning coalition for 
the incumbent leadership, thus harder to accomplish their policy objectives 
which could sustain their political survival. 
Stepan and Linz (2011) fleshed out the features of the veto players in 
politics, using an American example. First of all, Stepan and Linz explain that 
equal vote in the U.S. Senate for every state in the Union “generates by far the 
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greatest violation of the classic majority principal of “one person, one vote” of 
any of the eight federal democracies (p. 844). Second, the two scholars explain 
that the Senate’s upper hand in terms of the “influence on federal 
appointments than “one person, one vote” House of Representatives, and more 
prerogatives than any other democratically elected upper house” (p. 846). 
Third, the “majority-constraining features are constitutionally embedded and 
could, in theory, be changed by amendments supported by exceptional 
majorities of citizens” (p. 846). 
These basic insights into political institutions lead to a question about 
the influence of institutions on our day-to-day politics. Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2002) studied how political institutions influence the 
incentives of political leaders to distribute resources toward the provision of 
public goods, e.g. national security and the rule of law, and private goods. 
Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s empirical study yielded that the institutional 
structure affects the political leader’s policies on the distribution of resources 
toward the provision of both public and private goods. In detail, institutions 
with small winning coalitions discourage the provision of public goods that 
benefit the entire society. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002) explain that “these 
institutions also beneﬁt leaders’ welfare in comparison with other systems that 
encourage the provision of public goods.”  
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2.5. Putting Together 
This study has thus far reviewed several sets of literature individually 
to see what each academic discipline has explored that relate to the topic of 
this study. Based on these individual literature review, this section attempts 
to navigate how those individual literature speak to one another, so that a 
foundation can be constructed for generating testable hypotheses. In short, the 
financial development literature confirms the value of the development of 
cross-border M&A sector as a topic of scholarly endeavor. The business 
literature, on the other hand, offers all the basics for understanding the 
dependent variable of this study in general. The business literature 
nevertheless reveals one critical shortcoming, a factor which calls for the 
introduction of literature review in other disciplines: while the literature has 
exploited extensively on the impact of “institutions” on cross-border M&As it 
has not provided a clear definition of what it meant by institution. This in turn 
called for a clarification, which could be accomplished by reviewing the 
literature of relevant academic domains. On this note, the review of institution 
literature offered suggestions on the definition of institution, and that on 
varieties of capitalism suggested a number of ways to categorize capitalist 
economies as institutions. 
First, the economics literature provided an extensive volume on 
financial development, e.g. the role of financial system in economy and its core 
function. Second, the management literature is where everything about the 
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rudiments of cross-border M&As is to be found. What is most intriguing for 
this particular paper would be the key driving force of cross-border M&As. 
Shimizu et al. (2004) summarize the key motives for which companies seek 
after the acquisition of companies abroad can be summarized in threefold: first, 
to enter foreign market; second, to learn from foreign business culture; and 
third, as part of their value-creating strategy. 
Efforts have been made intensively to explore what leads companies to 
pursue a cross-border M&As. The literature suggests that among the most 
powerful influences in companies’ decision are geographical proximity, the 
movement of currency values, stock market performances, and valuation (Erel 
et al., 2012). That is, the closer the two companies are located the more likely 
they are to be merged or acquired by each other; the higher the appreciation of 
currency values the more likely are those countries to attempt to acquire 
foreign firms.12 Moreover, Erel et al. (2012) explains that “the greater the 
difference in stock market performance between the two countries, the more 
likely that ﬁrms in the superior-performing country purchase ﬁrms in the 
worse-performing country.” 
Within the diversity of most conspicuous topics in management 
literature is one directly related to the topic of this study: the importance of 
institutions in cross-border M&As. In essence, the lesson from the 
                                                          
12  Likewise, the companies that are located in countries where the currency values have 
depreciated relatively more than other countries are more likely to be targeted by potential 
acquirers. 
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management literature is that what is perhaps decisive factor which 
determines the success of attracting cross-border M&A inflows is institution, 
or more precisely, the quality of institutions. Empirical evidence of 165 
countries between 1997 and 2006 shows that countries with higher-quality 
institutions, namely developed countries, have attracted as much as ten times 
more inflows of cross-border M&A compared to the countries with inferior 
quality of institutions, i.e. developing countries (Hur et al., 2011). Institutional 
quality is determined based on several factors including, but not limited to, the 
degree of corruption by public officials, propriety of regulation, political 
stability, and the rule of law. 
Another empirical finding suggests that the quality of political 
institutions matters for inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), and it 
matters independently of the level of development of economy, i.e. gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007). And the 
supporting accounts are that, first, raising the standard of property rights and 
transparency can appeal to foreign investors thereby attracting more cross-
border M&A inflows; second, bad institutions can incur unnecessary costs for 
potential investors in cross-border M&As, e.g. rent-seeking due to corruption; 
and third, low-quality institutions can exacerbate uncertainty in government 
policies and administration, and this in turn, can make the potential investors 
to cross-border M&As who are, by and large, vulnerable to uncertainty due to 
a relatively high sunk cost (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007). 
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Taken together, the financial development literature revealed that a 
well-constructed financial system is a vital prerequisite for growth, and that 
certain conditions should be met, e.g. the liberalization of financial system and 
markets, and democratization, in order to accomplish a successful financial 
development. This leads to a conjecture that cross-border M&A market is also 
an important part of financial system, which can contribute to growth. The 
central takeaway from the literature review is that the financial development 
literature backs up an idea of this study that the development of cross-border 
M&A sector is important. 
The management literature demonstrated an “anatomy” of cross-border 
M&As. Among many, the literature has provided a forceful lesson on the 
importance of institutions, i.e. the quality of institutions, in attracting cross-
border M&As. However, the literature has revealed that the business scholars 
have taken the concept of institution for granted, i.e. using the concept without 
the clarification of the conceptual parameter of the institutions. This calls for 
clarification of the concept of institutions used in the literature, which goes 
beyond the scope of this study. So this study limits its parameter to political 
institutions. 
The VoC literature, on the other hand, has provided a useful 
conceptualization of capitalist economies and its taxonomy. There is obviously 
an ongoing debate about how to categorize the capitalist economies – most 
notably between a binary model or so-called a multiple model. The LME – CME 
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dichotomy of Hall and Soskice (2001) is a prime example for a binary model, 
while a few different models have been suggested to classify the capitalist 
economies in multiple forms.  
For example, Dore et al. (1999) categorize the capitalist economies into 
four types. First, the British model shows a heavy family control over 
manufacturing corporations, ample supplies of locally concentrated and highly 
skilled craft workers”(p. 103), and a tradition of technical specialists and 
administrative staffs building managerial organizations within the company. 
Second, the key features of the American model include the separation of 
managerial control and corporate ownership, use of retained earning s as the 
“financial foundation for investing in the further growth of the industrial 
enterprise” (p. 104), and promotion of specialists to upper levels to manage the 
company.  
Third, the German model boasts a considerable degree of educational 
preparation of work force for industrialization, “the diffusion of high-level 
scientific and technical education in the technische hochshulen” and the 
network of “ingenieurschulen for more practical skills” (p. 105), the role of 
leading commercial banks as the venture capital for the start-ups, and “a 
greater mobilization and further development of the capacity for collective 
action” such as compulsory membership in local chambers. Fourth and finally, 
the Japanese model reveals a “rapid creation of a high-quality system of higher 
education, supported by the state and pioneering industrialists” (p.105), and 
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“selection and concentration” as the base of industrial policies wherein a 
handful of domestic conglomerates (alias “Zaibatsu”) inherited the ownership 
and the control over the state-owned enterprises.  
Nevertheless, the contention seems to be overwhelmed by the typology 
offered by Hall and Soskice (2001) - LMEs and CMEs that are in a diagonal 
relationship. Other binary models of typology include ‘stock market capitalism’ 
versus ‘welfare capitalism’ (Dore, 2000), and ‘shareholder capitalism’ versus 
‘stakeholder capitalism’ by Will Hutton (Hutton and Giddens, 2000). Some 
scholars, on the contrary, argue that the typology of capitalism requires a 
multiple model, i.e. three or more categories. For example, Pontusson (2005) 
argues that the Nordic economies deserve an independent categories as ‘Social 
Market Economies (SMEs)’, so there should be three categories – LMEs, CMEs, 
and SMEs. Lastly, the political institution literature provided useful clues to 
set the conceptual boundaries of institution for this paper, as well as accounts 
on the core aspect and function of institution. 
Despite these telling lessons in the literature there still remains a gap 
to fill. First of all, the themes and lessons from the financial development 
literature remain rather broad and general in terms of its explanation on the 
development of particular financial sectors, e.g. cross-border M&A and 
derivatives market. Instead, the literature looks at the financial system as a 
whole. Secondly, despite tenacious efforts to understand the role and effect of 
institutions in cross-border M&As, the management literature falls short of 
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clarifying the concept of institution. Instead, the literature uses the concept of 
institution for granted and keeps the term vague, let alone specifying what 
aspects of institutions are being discussed. A brief review of the political 
institution was an ancillary measure to make up for the deficiency in the 
management literature. But such an auxiliary step still falls short of full 
clarification of the concept of institution in the management literature. 
Moreover, the varieties of capitalism literature shows a critical 
limitation: a problem of external validity. That is, while the literature offers 
very useful concepts to understand the variety in the modalities of capitalism, 
one critical limit appears – the scope of capitalism used in the literature is 
strictly constrained to the developed countries. For example, the majority of 
works in this particular domain reveal propensity toward the western world, 
e.g. U.S., U.K., and western Europe. The only exception in the literature is 
Japan. This constrains the application of the concepts and the typology of 
capitalist economy to a wider set of countries, thus triggering an issue of 
external validity. Taken together, it seems mandatory to make efforts to put 
together the literature of different academic disciplines to be able to answer 
the research question in this study. The hypotheses may be inferred from the 
literature of different academic disciplines. 
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Part Three. Hypotheses 
The central research question in this study is the relationship between 
political determinants and the development of cross-border M&A sector. In 
other words, this study aims at understanding what political factors contribute 
to or impede the development of cross-border M&A sector. The inquiry came 
about from the discovery of several gaps in the existing literature. For example, 
the scholarly efforts on the development of cross-border M&A sector, up to date, 
has born a stubborn propensity toward economic variables, i.e. attempts to 
expand the boundary of the explanatory variables for the development of cross-
border M&A sector have been limited to economic factors. Although the 
management literature has delved into the relationship between the 
institutions and the development of cross-border M&A sector, the literature 
has been unsuccessful in offering the exact definitional boundary of the 
explanatory variable, i.e. the institutions. 
There are nevertheless a number of reasons why one should delve into 
the political accounts on the development of cross-border M&A. First of all, the 
management literature sends a clear lesson that the role of institutions is 
crucial to the development of cross-border corporate M&As. In addition, the 
varieties of capitalism literature reinforced the lesson from the management 
literature, by showing that a difference in institutions can lead to different 
outcome in the capitalist world, as Hall and Soskice (2001) have shown 
regarding the LMEs and the CMEs’ approach to various policy issues, e.g. labor 
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relations and wage bargaining, industrial policy, and monetary policy. Lastly 
but equally importantly, the political institution literature suggests that one 
of the core functions of institution is to arrange the terms and conditions of 
rational exchanges in every aspect of daily human lives. That said, this study 
infers from the literature review and hypothesizes as follows: 
H1: Difference structures in political institution (e.g. presidential system 
vs. parliamentary system, political stability, and the magnitude of checks and 
balances) lead to different outcomes in the development of cross-border M&A 
sector. 
H2: Democracy is positively associated with the development of cross-
border M&A sector. 
 The two hypotheses can be disaggregated into the following. 
H1-a: A presidential system is more supportive than the parliamentary 
system to the development of cross-border M&A sector. 
H1-b: Constitutional limit on the number of years the executive can serve 
before new elections support the development of the cross-border M&A sector.13 
H1-c: If the party of the executive branch has control over the legislature, 
then the development of cross-border M&A sector will be more successful 
compared to the case in which such control does not exist. 
                                                          
13 See Table 4 for the row of the variable coded as “Finite Term.” 
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          H1-d: A plurality system in the legislative election is more conducive to 
the development of cross-border M&A sector than a system of proportional 
representation.14 
H1-e: The longer a country has been in a certain system, whether 
democracy or autocracy, the more likely this country experiences a successful 
development of cross-border M&A sector. 15 
H1-f: Checks and balances between the executive branch and the 
legislative branch support the development of a cross-border M&A sector.16  
H1-g: The fewer veto players there are the more successful the 
development of a cross-border M&A sector.17  
H2-a: The stronger a guarantee of the freedom of speech and association 
for citizens as well as the protection of human rights, and the stronger the 
accountability of the public officials, the more likely a country is to experience a 
successful development of cross-border M&A sector.18  
H2-b: The quality of bureaucracy is positively associated with the 
development of cross-border M&A sector.19 
                                                          
14 See Table 4 for the rows of the variables coded as “Upper House” and “Lower House.” 
15 See Table 4 for the row of the variable coded as “Tensys.” 
16 See Table 4 for the row of the variable coded as “Checks.” 
17 See Table 4 for the row of the variable coded as “Stabs.” 
18 See Table 4 for the row of the variable coded as “Voice and Accountability.” 
19 See Table 4 for the row of the variable coded as “Government Effectiveness.” 
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H2-c: The higher the degree of fairness and transparency of the 
regulatory system, the more likely a country is to experience a successful 
development of cross-border M&A sector.20 
H2-d: The degree of rule of law21 is in a positive relationship with the 
development of cross-border M&A sector.22  
H2-e: The level of corruption among public officials is inversely related 
to the development of cross-border M&A sector.23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 See Table 4 for the row of the variable coded as “Regulatory Quality.” 
21 Rule of law here encompasses the following categories: the level of crime, fairness of judicial 
process, enforceability of contracts, speediness of judicial process, history of confiscation, 
intellectual property rights protection, and the protection of private ownership. 
22 See Table 4 for the row of the variable coded as “Rule of Law.” 
23 See Table 4 for the row of the variable coded as “Control of Corruption.” 
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Part Four. Methods and Data 
This study uses a mixed method that combines of statistical analysis 
and comparative case studies. The quantitative method is applied primarily to 
test hypotheses using fixed effects model. In statistical analysis of panel data 
(see Table 1 for snapshots of the data), or cross-sectional time-series data, 
either random effects model or fixed effects model can be used. The key 
difference between the two models is that while random effects model assumes 
that the dataset is made up of a group of population wherein a hierarchy of 
some sort define the differences amongst one other in the population, fixed 
effects model assumes that some country-specific factors can bias both the 
independent and dependent variables thus need to control for this. Moreover, 
the fixed effects model assumes that the time-invariant features of each 
country in the dataset are specific to that particular country and should not be 
correlated with other country-specific characteristics. To determine which 
model to use, Hausman test (Table 2) was conducted and the test result 
suggested the use of fixed effects model, i.e. p-value was smaller than 0.05 (p-
value: 0.04884).  
The qualitative method, by contrast, is used to investigate what the real-
world examples say about the details of the outcome of the statistical analysis, 
i.e. a cross examination. That said, the dependent variable in this study is the 
cross-border M&A inflows. The independent variables are mainly concerned 
with political institutions and democracy. For instance, the variables 
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regarding political institution examine the system (presidential vs. 
parliamentary), legislative structure (unicameral or bicameral), whether there 
is a constitutional limit regarding the term in executive office, whether there 
are actual checks and balance in politics, or the percent of veto players who 
drop from the government in any given year. 
The operationalization of the explanatory variables on democracy relies 
on the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), particularly the Unit’s Democracy 
Index. The Index is based on the view that “measures of democracy that reflect 
the state of political freedoms and civil liberties are not thick enough”, i.e. 
“[t]hey do not encompass sufficiently, or, in some cases, at all, the features that 
determine how substantive democracy is” (p. 43~44).24 The EIU, in its 2015 
report, explains that the Index is based on five categories: “electoral process 
and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political 
participation; and political culture” (p. 44). This is because “[t]he condition of 
holding free and fair competitive elections, and satisfying related aspects of 
political freedom, is clearly the sine qua non of all definitions” of the modern 
democracy (p. 44), the EIT argues. Each category has a rating on a zero to ten 
scale, and “the overall Index is the simple average of the five category indexes.” 
The EIU adds that “[t]he category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator 
scores in the category, converted to a 0 to 10 scale” (p. 45). 
                                                          
24  The EIU’s Annual Report on Democracy Index 2015 
(http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf) 
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Accordingly, the variables regarding democracy in this study examine 
five factors. First, ‘voice and accountability’ variable concerns the depth of 
vested interests, accountability of public officials, human rights, and freedom 
of association. Second, a ‘government effectiveness’ variable is concerned with 
the quality of bureaucracy and institutional effectiveness, and the degree of 
bureaucracy (i.e. whether there is ‘red tape’ involved). Third, a ‘regulatory 
quality’ variable is related to the fairness in competitive practices, price 
controls, discriminatory tariffs, excessive protections, and discriminatory taxes. 
Fourth, a ‘rule of law’ variable concerns violent crime, organized crime, 
fairness and speediness of judicial process, enforceability of contracts, 
confiscation, protection of intellectual property rights, and private property 
protection. Lastly, the ‘control of corruption’ variable concerns corruption 
among public officials. 
The operationalization of the independent variables on political 
institutions counts on The Database of Political Institutions, which was 
compiled by the World Bank’s Development Research Group. The database has 
125 explanatory variables, including the ones used in this study, and these 
variables are sorted into five different group – first, chief executive variables; 
second, political party variables; third, electoral rules variables; fourth, 
stability and checks and balances variables; and fifth, federalism variables. 
Lastly, several factor had been controlled for to avoid the distortion of result, 
e.g. GDP growth, exchange rate, and inflation. 
48 
 
The panel data used in the statistical analysis of this study is 
established based on a variety of data sources, and covers 167 countries 
between 2002 and 2012. The M&A data are collected from an online database 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 
STAT)25. The data for the political institution variables are collected from the 
Database of Political Institutions 201226 and Beck et al. (2001). The democracy 
variables are collected from the Economist Intelligence Unit.  
The parameter of the panel data was finalized based on a single criterion 
– minimizing the impact of missing data problem. Several sets of raw data were 
gathered from various sources, and were examined for comparability. Initially, 
the raw datasets included approximately 215 entities (two hundred plus 
countries and about a dozen of other entities27), and the time spanning from 
1960 to 2015. The datasets were than sorted to come up with the so-called 
“least common denominator” which can rule out as many blanks as possible. 
The result was 167 countries in eleven years of timespan (2002~2012). 
                                                          
25 UNCTAD STAT: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Online Statistics 
Database (http://unctadstat.unctad.org).  
26 The Database of Political Institutions is available at the World Bank Online Database on 
Development Research 
(http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:
20649465~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html) 
27 “Other entities” include the following: first of all, non-sovereign independent economies like 
Hong Kong and Macau, both of which are the Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China; second, newly-born sovereign states like the Republic of South Sudan; third, 
vanished states like the Democratic Republic of Germany (East Germany) and Czechoslovakia; 
fourth, statistically unreliable states like Eritrea and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (North Korea); and finally, marginal entities (in the financial world) with significant 
degree of missing data such as the Arab Republic of Yemen, Cape Verde, Macedonia, Palau, 
San Marino, Sint Eustatius and Saba Bonaire, Somalia, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turks and 
Caicos Islands, and Tuvalu. 
49 
 
Part Five. Statistical Analysis 
The statistical analysis tested the following model using the fixed effects 
model: the dependent variable is the cross-border corporate M&A inflows, and 
the independent variables are related to democracy and political institutions.28  
𝒚 = 𝜶𝒙𝟏 + 𝜷𝒙𝟐 + 𝜸𝒙𝟑 + 𝜹𝒙𝟒 + 𝜺𝒙𝟓 +∙∙∙ +𝝀𝒙𝟏𝟏 + 𝝁𝒙𝟏𝟐 
In essence, the result (N=228) suggests that democracy matters greatly 
for the development of cross-border M&A market, i.e. democracy contributes 
to the development of cross-border M&A sector. Specifically, the democracy-
related explanatory variables were found to be positively associated with the 
development of cross-border M&A sector, except the “government effectiveness” 
variable, which refers to the quality of bureaucracy and the thickness of “red 
tape.” Conversely, political institutions were found to be irrelevant to the 
development of cross-border M&A sector. This is mainly because the 
relationship discovered in this test were statistically insignificant for all the 
explanatory variables of political institution. In (Table 8), the coefficient 
(1466.665) shows that the degree of democracy, which was operationalized by 
the Democracy Index, is positively associated with the development of cross-
border M&A sector. In detail, the statistical analysis showed that, regarding 
the voice and accountability (coded as VA), the higher the accountability of 
public officials, protection of human rights, and the degree of freedom of 
                                                          
28 Refer to the Appendix for the details of the explanatory variables. 
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association, the better the cross-border corporate M&A sector is developed 
(Table 4). This result was statistically significant.  
With regard to the regulation (coded as “RQ”), the analysis 
demonstrated that what contributed to the development of cross-border M&A 
sector were the fairness in competitive practices, effective price controls and 
discriminatory tariffs, controlling excessive protection, and discriminatory 
taxes – all of which were grouped into one indicator that was named as 
“Regulatory Quality” (RQ). The quantitative analysis also revealed that 
suppressing corruption amongst government officials (coded as “CC”) 
contribute significantly to the development of cross-border M&A sector, as the 
magnitude of control on corruption was in a positive relationship with the 
dependent variable.  
The test also revealed that the rule of law (coded as “RL”) is in a positive 
relationship with the cross-border M&A sector: strict suppression over crime, 
intellectual property rights violation, and confiscation led to more successful 
development of cross-border M&A sector. On the contrary, the effectiveness of 
government administration (coded as “GE”) yielded a negative coefficient, i.e. 
the degree of effectiveness of the administrative institution is inversely related 
to the development of cross-border M&A sector. This particular result was 
statistically significant.29 
                                                          
29 This is a counterintuitive, thus interesting, result which calls for further exploration in other 
research opportunity, since it goes beyond the scope of this particular study. 
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By contrast, the statistical analysis demonstrated that political 
institutions wield very weak influence at best to the development of cross-
border M&A market around the world. This is because the political institution 
variables were statistically insignificant. That said, the statistical analysis on 
the relationship between political system revealed that the countries with a 
constitutional limit, on the number of years the executive can serve before new 
elections are called, yielded a superior result in the development of the cross-
border M&A sector (Table 4). This finding bears a problem of statistical 
insignificance thus ruled out. With regard to the legislative system, the result 
of this quantitative analysis suggested that the countries in which, when it 
comes to the electoral rule for the legislature, the rule of proportional 
representation, as opposed to the plurality rule, led to a better result in the 
development of cross-border M&A sector (Table 4). Next, regarding the 
stability of political system as well as checks and balances of power the 
analysis demonstrated that the longer any given country has been democratic 
the better result was brought about for the development of the cross-border 
M&A sector. This result was statistically insignificant (Table 4). 
In sum, the statistical analysis showed that democracy, or the degree of 
democratization, is significantly influential to the development of the cross-
border M&A sector. Specifically, several aspects of democracy – voice and 
accountability, the quality of regulatory framework its enforcement, the rule 
of law, corruption control, and the effectiveness in the government 
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administration – all contribute to the development of cross-border M&A 
market. On the contrary, how political institution is designed does not appear 
to influence the development of cross-border M&A sector. While the statistical 
analysis yielded certain correlation between the explanatory variables of the 
political institution domain, these relationships were not meaningful due to its 
statistical insignificance.  
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Part Six. Case Studies 
This section conducts comparative case studies on the Republic of Korea 
(henceforth Korea) and Japan. This East Asian pair forms, what is called in 
comparative politics, a most different systems design of comparative case 
studies. In short, the two countries form a most different systems design 
because difference in the longevity of the political regime and political 
institutions led to a successful development of cross-border M&A sector in both 
cases. Japan represents a case of long-lived democracy, parliamentary system, 
and an industrialized economy, while Korea is a case of rather nascent 
democracy, presidential system, and a developing economy. But both countries 
yielded a successful development of cross-border M&A sector. The section looks 
at the two cases individually and then compares to derive key lessons. 
6.1. Japan 
6.1.1. Cross-Border M&A 
Japan is the pioneer of modern finance in Asia. The nation thus has had 
a modern financial system and financial institutions that date back to mid-
nineteenth century when the national movement for modernization, or Meiji 
restoration of 1868, took place. Likewise, Japan has developed a financial 
system that is sustained by three key pillars and is bank-based. The three 
pillars were commercial banks, life insurance, and government-owned 
financial institutions (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2004).  The origin of such design of 
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financial system is still under exploration, but what seems apparent is that the 
cross-border M&A sector emerged in a severely lagged manner, i.e. while the 
exact time is unknown, there is a tacit consensus amongst professionals that 
the cross-border M&A sector in Japan did not hit its stride until the 1990s.  
   Instead, the Japanese financial system has developed with certain 
characteristics, including the bank-centered structure. The Japanese financial 
system emerged during the early 1950s as the country struggled to bounce 
back from the aftermath of the World War II. The Japanese financial system 
experienced, until the early 1970s, tight regulation, severe competition in the 
banking sector, and an active role of government in directing loans. 
Another notable feature of the Japanese financial system in this era was 
a rapid growth without international capital. Several factors enabled this to 
happen, according to Teranishi (1994): first, Japan’s balanced budget policy 
and a relatively low share of government expenditures in GDP; second, 
international capital markets were underdeveloped; third, a scarcity in Japan’s 
foreign reserves discouraged the Japanese government to reach out to the 
international capital market; fourth, the rapid growth of Japanese exports 
reduced the necessity of replenishing foreign exchange by way of importing 
capital; and fifth, Japan’s strict regulation of international capital transactions 
provided a necessary condition for sustaining the financial system. 
    Sakakibara and Feldman (1983) explain that the Japanese financial 
system created distinctive characteristics during this period. To begin with, 
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debts deepened consistently, mainly due to the shortage of capital. Second, the 
government maintained a high degree of intermediation by directing the 
allocation of financial resources. Third, the government insisted on keeping 
public debt at a low level. Lastly, low levels of credit for individual consumers 
and small businesses. 
Decades of rapid growth transformed Japan to a developed economy. 
The financial liberalization set on with Japan’s economic accomplishment since 
the early 1970s. Several key features of Japan’s deregulation are worth noting. 
First, the money market was expanded as new financial instruments were 
introduced, e.g. certificate of deposit (CD), treasury bills, and commercial 
paper (CP). Second, such introduction of new financial instruments triggered 
the deregulation of deposits at commercial banks, trust banks, long-term credit 
banks, and the postal savings. Third, the government bond market was 
deregulated due to the issuance of a large sum of revenue-financing bonds in 
1975 (Patrick and Park, 1994). 
The internationalization of Japanese financial system unfolded in 
tandem with deregulation. The enactment of a new Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Law of 1980 lifted the ban on international financial 
transaction in the Japanese financial markets. This measure, in principle, 
offered a full-scale freedom of international financial transaction by Japanese 
and foreign entities alike. Moreover, Tokyo lifted the restriction on currency 
swaps in 1984, i.e. the restriction which curbed the amount of foreign currency 
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that could be converted to the yen by the financial institutions. In the same 
year, Japan repealed the “real demand doctrine” so as to encourage forward 
exchange transactions. Previously, the doctrine allowed forward exchange 
transactions for only trade. 
It is within this tide of liberalization that the cross-border M&A sector 
in Japan grew. According to RECOF30, the cases of cross-border M&A in Japan 
grew from 195 cases in 1986 to 643 cases in 2013. During these period, the 
inbound M&A market grew by tenfold while the outbound market grew by 2.75 
times.31 Some characteristics are worth noting with regard to Japan’s cross-
border M&A market: first, rapid expansion of the market in the mid- and late-
1980s; second, steady but gradual development of the market in the 1990s; 
third, rapid surge around the turn of the millennium; fourth, steady market 
situation in the 2000s; and fifth, sharp decline in the late 2000s following the 
Great Recession. 
Bebenroth (2015) explains that although the international investors 
made their inroads into the Japanese market as early as early 1960s, their 
mergers and acquisitions attempts were largely unsuccessful mainly due to 
“informal hindrances.” That is, “even though a foreign firm may offer more 
advanced technology, they still may not be able to compete with a Japanese 
                                                          
30 RECOF (www.recof.co.jp) is a Japanese consulting firm specializing in corporate M&A. The 
data was sourced from several issues of RECOF’s M&A database (1986-2014). 
31 The cases of foreign corporations acquiring Japanese firms grew from only 14 cases in 1986 
to 149 cases in 2013. On the other hand, the cases of Japanese companies acquiring companies 
abroad grew from 181 cases in 1986 to 499 cases in 2013, according to RECOF. 
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firm” because Japanese firms has competitive advantage in “software”, e.g. 
brand image, understanding on particular behavioral patterns of Japanese 
consumers, etc. 
With regard to the development of cross-border M&A sector in Japan, 
Bebenroth (2015) argues that the expansion of cross-border M&A sector in 
Japan in the late 1980s was attributable to Japan’s economic bubble. Also, the 
sharp expansion of the sector in the late 1990s results from the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997-98. That is, a disastrous collapse of the Asia’s financial market 
during the crisis diverted the interests of the international investors to a “safer” 
market, and as a consequence the international capital turned to Asia’s most 
advanced market to invest. Lastly, a drastic plunge of the cross-border M&A 
sector in Japan after 2008 was a consequence of the Great Recession, 
Bebenroth added. 
6.1.2. Political Institution 
Japan is officially a constitutional monarchy with bicameral legislature. 
The emperor is the symbolic leader of the nation, and the prime minister is the 
head of government and the chief of the ruling party. This democratic nation 
with a parliamentary system features a bicameral structure in the legislature 
– House of Councillors (參議院. Upper House) and House of Representatives 
(衆議院. Lower House). Just like in any other country with parliamentary 
system, the head of the party which wins the legislative election takes the 
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prime minister position, i.e. no limit on the number of continuous terms one 
can serve in office. This enables the executive branch in Japan to wield control 
of the legislature. Consequently, checks and balances is functioning rather in 
an “one way” style than in a “two-way street” style the institutional 
frameworks of Japanese politics. 
The party system in Japan is multi-partisan, i.e. several parties are 
represented in the legislature. However, one party has monopolized the control 
of the executive in the postwar era except for a few years: the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP. 自民黨) monopolized the prime minister’s office since 
1947, and the prime ministers from other parties ruled for a total of six years 
during this period.32 
6.1.3. Democracy 
The Economist Intelligence Unit ranks Japan as the 23rd among one 
hundred and sixty-seven countries in the world in 2015, or a “flawed democracy” 
in terms of democracy. The country’s score was 8.08 in the Economist’s 
                                                          
32 The first non-LDP rule came about in August 1993, as Hosokawa Morihiro of Japan New 
Party (日本新黨) sworn in. Hata Tsutomu (日本新生黨 Japan Renewal Party) and Murayama 
Tomiichi (日本社會黨. The Socialist Party of Japan) succeeded Hosokawa in order. This non-
LDP rule ended in January 1996 as the LDP reclaimed the Prime Minister’s Office. The second 
non-LDP rule came in September 2009, as the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ. 日本民主黨) 
surprised the nation with a landslide victory in general election. As a consequence, three DPJ 
politicians – Hatoyama Yukio (鳩山由紀夫), Kan Naoto (管直人), and Noda Yoshihiko (野田佳彦) 
led Japan for about three years total. But the LDP, once again, recaptured the Prime Minister’s 
office in 2012 general election. Since then Abe Shinzo (安倍晋三) has been serving as the prime 
minister. 
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Democracy Index in 2012.33 The magazine constructed the Index based on five 
components - electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of 
government, political participation, and political culture. The Economist 
explains that “[b]ased on their scores on a range of indicators within these 
categories, each country is then itself categorized as one of four types of regime: 
‘full democracies’, ‘flawed democracies’, ‘hybrid regimes’, and ‘authoritarian 
regimes’.” Further analysis of Japan’s democracy will follow below. 
6.2. Republic of Korea 
6.2.1. Development of Cross-Border M&A Sector 
The cross-border mergers and acquisitions is a recent phenomenon in 
Korea. Once the flagship of the Asian Tigers, the foreign acquisitions and 
mergers of Korean corporations became salient only after the onset of the 
financial crisis of 1997-98. Before the crisis, the Korean financial system was 
rather secluded from the international financial market. 
The modern financial system was introduced in the late 1800s as the 
first modern financial institution (조흥은행. Chohung Bank) was established 
in 1897 by the royal family of the Chosun Dynasty. During Japanese 
occupation (1910-1945) the Korean financial system mainly functioned in 
various roles assigned by the Japanese Government-General. And the 
                                                          
33 The Index is computed in a zero to ten scale. 
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development of the current financial system in Korea began as Korea became 
an independent republic in August, 1945. 
During the early years of the Republic of Korea, the financial system 
remained underdeveloped. The core achievement during this period would be 
the establishment of the Korea Development Bank (한국산업은행), the 
government’s main financial vehicle for industrial policies. And the 
development of the financial system emerged as Park Chung-hee (박정희) 
usurped power in 1961. As the nation’s leader, Park put forth ‘poverty 
eradication’ as the top priority of his leadership, and aggressively pursued 
economic development policies. For example, the Park administration 
reorganized the agricultural financing and marketing institutions by 
combining the agricultural cooperatives and the Agricultural Bank into one 
entity – National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (NFAC. 
농업협동조합중앙회). Also, the government established the Industrial Bank of 
Korea (IBK. 중소기업은행) to funnel loans to the small and medium enterprises. 
The build-up of financial system by the Park administration continued 
into the late 1960s, as the Korea Exchange Bank (KEB. 한국외환은행) was 
established in January 1967 to support Korean companies' export. On a par, 
the government licensed the establishment of local banks so as to serve the 
financial needs of local entities. The 1970s saw the establishment of non-
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banking financial institutions (NBFIs), e.g. development institutions like 
Export-Import Bank of Korea (한국수출입은행), mutual savings bank, and 
credit unions.  
Capital market development hit its stride in tandem with the 
development of other financial sectors. With the launch of the Capital Markets 
Fostering Act in 1968, major corporations, or the subsidiaries of Chaebols, went 
public to the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE). The government applied several 
policy measures to encourage the initial public offerings (IPOs) of domestic 
firms, e.g. favorable tax treatments. Although the government concentrated 
intensively on the construction of the financial system it maintained a heavy 
interventionist position. For example, the government set daily limits on the 
price of listed stocks and bought back the government and public bonds. In 
addition, the government issued guarantee for corporate bonds (Cole and Park, 
1983). 
Park Chung-hee’s term ended in October 1979 due to assassination by 
his spy chief – Kim Jae-kyoo, then the head of the Korean Central Intelligence 
Agency. And his successor - Chun Doo-hwan - carried on with the legacy of 
Park, by pursuing economic development. The 1980s and 90s saw a full-scale 
financial liberalization in Korea. For example, CP was introduced in 1981 and 
the government-owned commercial banks were privatized between 1981 and 
1983. Also, entry barriers to the financial industry were significantly lowered 
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in 1988, and the ban on foreign ownership of domestic insurance and securities 
firms was lifted also in 1988. In addition, several measures to liberalize the 
capital account and the foreign exchange market were put in place between 
1980 and 1992, e.g. revision of FDI policies from the positive system to the 
negative system (1984), the establishment of foreign exchange call market 
(1989), and the launch of the Market Average Exchange Rate system (1990). 
Park (1996) explained that the “current account surpluses in 1986-89 provided 
further impetus to deregulate foreign exchange transactions in areas such as 
position management, documentation requirements, and the international use 
of the won” (p. 251). 
The 1990s was the era of ferment in Korea’s financial system. A rapid 
economic growth in the previous decade endowed a cumulating corporate debts, 
and the accumulation of debts continued well into the 1990s. And as the 
financial crisis swept Asia in 1997, Korea became one of the most severely 
struck economies, mainly due to a festered problem of excessive short-term 
borrowing which, in turn, led to debt maturity mismatch. The Korean economy, 
after being bailed out by the International Monetary Fund in December 1997, 
was able to bounce back in a few years thanks to the faithful compliance to the 
IMF’s bailout conditions. 
The biggest legacy of the Asian financial crisis and the experience of the 
IMF bailout was an unprecedented liberalization of the financial system. 
Particularly, as part of compliance to the conditionality of the Fund’s bailout, 
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Korea witnessed foreign ownership of domestic financial institutions for the 
first time. The emergence of foreign ownership in the financial sector is part of 
international capital’s investment in distressed assets (Mody and Negishi, 
2000). For example, Germany’s Commerzbank purchased the controlling share 
of Korea Exchange Bank in 1999, and Lone Star Fund (a Dallas, Texas-based 
private equity fund) acquired the German’s KEB share in 2003. Moreover, 
Korea First Bank (KFB. 제일은행), one of the most gravely damaged financial 
institutions by the Asian financial crisis, was taken over by New Bridge 
Capital – a San Francisco, California-based private equity fund (PEF). KFB 
held a massive sum (17 trillion won, or approximately US$ 18bn) of toxic assets 
to the Chaebols, e.g. Daewoo Group (then the second largest conglomerate in 
Korea) and Hanbo Group (Korea’s construction giant). 
Today, Korea reveals one of the largest foreign presence in Asia. For 
instance, six of the seven commercial banks have foreign majority stakes 
(including two wholly-owned foreign banks), about a third of securities firms 
are foreign-owned, and about one fifth of the life insurance industry is owned 
by foreign capital. Most recently, China’s Anbang Insurance acquired one 
hundred percent of Germany’s Allianz Insurance, Korea in April 2016. 
6.2.2. Political Institution 
Korea is a presidential republic with unicameral legislature, where the 
president is the head of state. The Korean presidency is subject to 
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constitutional limit, which shows contrast with Japan – single term of five 
years. Korea’s National Assembly (대한민국 국회) is elected every four years, 
and has three hundred members. Among them, two hundred and fifty-three 
members represent their constituency and are elected by the plurality vote. 
Forty-seven members are elected through proportional party votes. Such 
institutional structure in Korea allows for strong checks and balances.  
Korea features a multi-party system: while there are more than a dozen 
political parties registered to the National Election Commission, the two major 
parties (Saenuri Party and the Democratic Party of Korea), in reality, split the 
Assembly into halves – 157and 127 seats, respectively. Just like in any other 
presidential system, the legislative majority does not always take the executive 
branch. But when the ruling party occupies the majority in the legislature, it 
enables the executive branch in Korea to wield control over the legislature. 
Consequently, checks and balances may function imperfectly in the 
institutional frameworks of Korean politics. 
6.2.3. Democracy 
The Economist Intelligence Unit ranked Korea as the 22nd among one 
hundred and sixty-seven countries in the world in 2015, or a “flawed 
democracy.” Korea’s Democracy Index was gauged 8.13, as in zero to ten scale, 
in 2012. 
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6.3. Discussion 
The two cases form the most different systems design: a pair of different 
cases yield very similar outcomes in terms of the development of cross-border 
M&A sector. In a nutshell, Japan was an industrialized economy with a long 
history of democracy that adopted a parliamentary system. And her experience 
of cross-border M&A sector development was unfolded as a consequence of 
economic boom, which is a natural phenomenon in the modern capitalist 
economy. Conversely, Korea was a developing economy with a short history of 
democracy that adopted the presidential system. Moreover, Seoul’s experience 
of the development of cross-border M&A sector set on as a consequence of 
external pressure, i.e. the bailout conditions imposed by the IMF at the time of 
the Asian financial crisis. Although there had been fierce public wrath about 
the conditions demanded by the Fund, the Korean government infused forceful 
thrust in pushing forward its policy to cope with the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis through the bailout. This was possible mainly due to the fact 
that she had adopted presidential system, i.e. the executive branch could 
concentrate its authority and resources on pushing forward its decision to take 
the IMF bailout with little to no domestic vetoes. Regardless, both economies 
have reached a status of advanced M&A markets in the world. In sum, this 
study suggests that the two different cases both yielded a successful 
development of cross-border M&A sector mainly due to a fact that both are 
democracies. 
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First of all, Japan was already in the status of a highly industrialized 
economy when the development of cross-border M&A sector began in earnest 
in the mid-1980s. In addition, Tokyo already had a long legacy of modern 
political and economic institutions, which dates back to 1868 when the Empire 
of Japan established constitutional monarchy. This meant that the politics and 
the economy in Japan would operate in a systemized way rather than in a 
discretionary or random way. As mentioned earlier, Japan had already become 
the home of an economic ‘miracle’ in the 1970s, thus joined the elite club of the 
world economy – namely the Group of Seven (G7) along with Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
On this note, the development of cross-border M&A came about as part 
of a natural consequence of economic boom. That is, as the economic boom in 
the 1970s carried on into the following decade, the mergers and acquisitions of 
Japanese firms by international capital also prospered. In sum, Japan’s case 
of the development of cross-border M&A sector took place in an environment 
of highly industrialized economy, or a developed economy, and took place as 
part of natural consequence of economic boom. On the contrary, the 
development of the cross-border M&A sector in Korea hit its stride when Korea 
was in the developing country status 34 , and especially when the Korean 
economy was in horrendous crisis. Moreover, unlike in Japan where the 
                                                          
34 Korea is still considered to be a developing economy and not a developed economy, although 
equally many consider Korea to be among the leaders of the developing economies. 
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development of cross-border M&A sector occurred as part of the consequence 
of economic boom, i.e. a natural phenomenon in economy, the development of 
cross-border M&A sector was rather forced. 
That is, the Korean economy was under strict intervention and control 
by the government since its development unfolded with the emergence of 
military dictatorship in 1961. Since then, every corner of the Korean economy 
was under government control as the military government aggressively 
pursued development and economic growth. Along this process, the Korean 
financial system subordinated to the government mandates and mainly served 
as capital funneling channel through the aforementioned government financial 
vehicles. This was possible mainly because Seoul had a short history of 
democracy and modern capitalist economy, though growing at a rapid pace, so 
much so that the politics and the economy were operated on less systemic way 
and more or less on discretionary manner. In other words, the Korean case 
shows that Seoul was able to reach out for the IMF bailout over a fierce public 
wrath because the executive branch could wield a greater level of authority in 
pushing forward their policy objectives without strong vetoes, and also because 
a relative short legacy of democracy endowed the president with discretion to 
attain his policy goals without dealing with the resistance from the oppositions. 
This was the basic environment of the Korean economy and financial 
system throughout the military dictatorship era (1961-1993). During this 
period, the Korean economy accomplished success of what many people call the 
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“miracle of the Han River.” But the darkness of the economic success lingered 
on as Seoul achieved accomplished a transition to democracy in 1993, and a 
persisting issue of mounting corporate debts doomed the Korean economy to 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. 
    It is after the 1997 financial crisis destroyed the entire Korean economy 
when the development of cross-border M&A sector started. Specifically, 
contrary to Japan, where the cross-border M&A sector developed as a 
consequence of economic boom, Korea’s cross-border M&A sector was 
developed by force. When the IMF approved Korea’s application to bailout, the 
Fund mandated a wide array of conditions to be fulfilled by the Korean 
government in exchange for the bailout, e.g. bailout conditionality. In a 
nutshell, the IMF’s conditionality mandated the “restructuring” of the entire 
economy to improve the overall ‘efficiency’ and ‘transparency’ of the economy. 
For example, the Fund mandated that the Korean government direct a so-
called “Big Deal” amongst the Chaebols, so that those conglomerates improve 
the efficiency of their business portfolio. Also, the IMF ordered that Seoul free 
the financial system by lifting a wide range of bans that had been in place for 
decades. It is within this category which the IMF pried open Korea’s financial 
markets, and along this particular process the development of cross-border 
M&A sector emerged. The aforementioned foreign acquisitions of Korea’s 
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domestic commercial banks, e.g. Korea Exchange Bank, Korea First Bank, and 
Citi Group’s acquisition of Hanmi Bank in 2004.35 
Next, the two Asian economies reveal a sharp contrast with regard to 
political institutions. On one hand, Japan uses parliamentary and bicameral 
system wherein the majority party in the legislature possesses the prime 
minister position, and also wherein a constitutional limit on the term of prime 
minister is absent. So checks works only one way – from the executive to the 
legislature. On the other hand, Korea adopts presidential and unicameral 
system wherein the president (the head of state and the head of the executive 
branch) and the lawmakers are elected separately. So the checks and balances 
work both ways between the executive branch and the legislature, and when 
the opposition party(ies) possess the majority in the National Assembly the 
checks and balances work even stronger than in the case which the same party 
possesses the president position and the majority in the legislature. 
Party system is another point of contrast between the two nations. Both 
countries adopt multi-party system wherein unlimited number of political 
parties can coexist, at least in theory. However, Japan has been experiencing 
a de-facto single-party dominance while Korea showed a frequent expansion 
                                                          
35  This paragraph is sourced from various news articles in online archive. 
http://newslibrary.naver.com/search/searchByKeyword.nhn#%7B%22mode%22%3A1%2C%22
sort%22%3A0%2C%22trans%22%3A1%2C%22pageSize%22%3A10%2C%22keyword%22%3A
%22IMF%20%EA%B5%AC%EC%A0%9C%EA%B8%88%EC%9C%B5%20%EC%A1%B0%EA
%B1%B4%22%2C%22status%22%3A%22success%22%2C%22startIndex%22%3A1%2C%22pa
ge%22%3A1%7D (Accessed 2:32pm, PST on March 26, 2016). 
70 
 
and contraction of the party system. That is, in Japan the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) has dominated the National Diet, except for about six years in 
total, since current constitution was inaugurated in 1947, thus nearly 
monopolizing the prime minister position. Conversely, in Korea several parties 
coexisted although there was a clear division between major parties and minor 
parties. But even within the circle of major political parties, numerous factions 
have allied and dis-allied with one another frequently. For 2016 general 
election twenty-four parties have joined the race, including four major parties 
and twenty minor, or even mini parties. 
In reverse to the other variables investigated in this paper, democracy 
shows the lowest degree of difference between the two countries. As mentioned 
earlier, both Korea and Japan are democracies, although Japan has been in 
democracy for much longer than Korea. And both countries are categorized as 
“flawed democracy” by the Economist Democracy Index. 36  The level of 
democracy in the two countries has been more or less the same during the 
period of interest in this paper: 2002~2012. 
 
                                                          
36 The Democracy Index ranked Korea and Japan 22nd and 23rd, respectively for 2015. The 
Index groups the countries into four, and the ‘flawed democracy’ is the second from the top. 
The four categories are ‘full democracy’ (rank 1~20), ‘flawed democracy’ (rank 21~79), ‘hybrid 
regime’ (rank 80~115), and ‘autocratic regime’ (rank 116~167). Other ‘flawed democracy’ 
includes Belgium, Chile, France, Israel, Italy, Taiwan, etc. ‘Full democracy’ includes Britain, 
Canada, Germany, Mauritius, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden), Uruguay, U.S., etc. 
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Part Seven. Conclusion 
This study has explored the yet-underexploited arena of the studies in 
the development of cross-border M&A sector around the world, particularly the 
political economy of the development of cross-border mergers and acquisition 
sector. In doing so, I have applied a mixed method to examine the research 
question. The quantitative analysis, on the cases of 167 countries between 2002 
and 2012, suggests that democracy wields a great deal of influence in the 
development of the cross-border M&A sector. As mentioned earlier, this is 
mainly because of the democracy’s capability of protection of property rights 
and private ownership, as well as its superior transparency which, in turn, 
provides a better predictability of future. 
The latter part of this study looked into a pair of East Asian cases – 
Korea and Japan - to examine what the real-world examples say about the 
statistical test of the research question. The pair showed that although they 
are much different in various aspects, e.g. political institutions, party system, 
etc., they yielded similar outcomes: despite these differences the two countries 
have yielded a well-crafted and vibrant cross-border M&A sector. And the most 
notable difference between Korea and Japan from the thrust of the 
development: while the development of cross-border M&A sector in Japan was 
made possible mainly owing to a natural consequence of its economic boom in 
1970s and 80s, that in Korea came about as a consequence of external pressure, 
i.e. IMF bailout conditionality. 
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This study has left several things to ponder on as the scholarship on the 
cross-border M&As moves forward. Among them is a call for increased 
scholarly attention: scholars should pay more attention to the political aspects 
of cross-border M&A. This is because the “rules” of which govern this type of 
international financial business is being determined not in the business arena 
but in the political sphere. And there are obviously certain types “rules of 
business” that are favored by the international investors in cross-border M&A 
over other types, thus looking at the political environment / conditions / 
institutions / from which those favorable rules of M&A business come will be 
of utmost importance. 
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Appendix 
(Table 1) Snapshots of the Data 
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(Table 2) Hausman Test 
Hausman Test 
Data: MNA ~ system+finittrm+housesys+sensys+tensys+checks+ … 
Chisq=19.753, df=11, p-value=0.04884 
Alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent 
 
 
 
 
 
(Table 3) Random Effects Model 
Coefficients:     
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 956.1629 11460.4837 0.0834 0.933587 
System1 -6352.7413 5843.1437 -1.0872 0.278166 
Finite term -2308.3653 7758.4261 -0.2975 0.766350 
Lower house -2554.6144 3250.7988 -0.7858 0.432829 
Upper house -9.8714 11.2730 -0.8757 0.382193 
System 
longevity 
349.9216 115.7738 3.0225 0.002813** 
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Checks and 
balances 
886.0858 560.7245 1.5803 0.115526 
Stability -2015.2537 3641.3952 -0.5534 0.580547 
VA 28608.2737 13488.9632 2.1209 0.035084* 
GE -21329.0858 10375.3259 -2.0558 0.041020* 
RQ 7062.9752 13295.6417 0.5312 0.595814 
RL -21645.5933 14303.1200 -1.5133 0.131667 
CC 19046.2026 9081.9053 2.0972 0.037154* 
 
 
 
(Table 4) Fixed Effects Model 
Coefficients:     
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
58104.68 20656.95 2.8128 0.005432** 
Government 
Effectiveness 
-28314.60 13468.14 -2.1023 0.036855* 
Regulatory 
Quality 
19645.55 23833.15 0.8243 0.410816 
Rule of Law 6716.96 23760.12 0.2827 0.777719 
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Control of 
Corruption 
27868.82 14703.86 1.8953 0.059582. 
Finite Term37 -1526.41 10987.28 -0.1389 0.889658 
Lower House38 -3410.35 7434.19 -0.4587 0.646952 
Upper House39 7393.01 10510.35 0.7034 0.482675 
Tensys40 323.58 366.11 0.8838 0.377914 
Checks41 945.04 647.90 1.4586 0.146337 
Stabs42 -3798.14 3753.61 -1.0119 0.312904 
 
 
(Table 5) Fixed Effects: Entity-specific Intercepts 
Coefficients:     
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
Voice and 
Accountability 
58104.68 20656.95 2.8128 0.005432** 
Government 
Effectiveness 
-28314.60 13468.14 -2.1023 0.036855* 
                                                          
37 Is there a constitutional limit on the number of years the executive can serve before new 
elections must be called? 
38 Plurality or proportional representation in the lower house? 
39 Plurality or proportional representation in the upper house? 
40 How long has the country been autocratic or democratic, respectively? 
41 Do both the executive branch and the legislature wield checks to each other, or not? 
42 The percentage of veto players who drop from the government in any given year. 
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Regulatory 
Quality 
19645.55 23833.15 0.8243 0.410816 
Rule of Law 6716.96 23760.12 0.2827 0.777719 
Control of 
Corruption 
27868.82 14703.86 1.8953 0.059582. 
Finite Term43 -1526.41 10987.28 -0.1389 0.889658 
Lower House44 -3410.35 7434.19 -0.4587 0.646952 
Upper House45 7393.01 10510.35 0.7034 0.482675 
Tensys46 323.58 366.11 0.8838 0.377914 
Checks47 945.04 647.90 1.4586 0.146337 
Stabs48 -3798.14 3753.61 -1.0119 0.312904 
F-statistic: 2.26217 on 11 and 188 DF, p-value: 0.013076 
 
(Table 6) Fixed Effects for Countries 
Algeria Australia Belgium Bhutan 
-41857.46 -67270.96 -49367.29 -37729.77 
Bolivia Brazil Burundi Czech Republic 
-44819.21 -33766.44 -41470.17 -74464.77 
                                                          
43 Is there a constitutional limit on the number of years the executive can serve before new 
elections must be called? 
44 Plurality or proportional representation in the lower house? 
45 Plurality or proportional representation in the upper house? 
46 How long has the country been autocratic or democratic, respectively? 
47 Do both the executive branch and the legislature wield checks to each other, or not? 
48 The percentage of veto players who drop from the government in any given year. 
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Dominican Rep. Dem Rep. Congo Germany Haiti 
-34777.87 -17443.33 -14720.38 -48160.05 
India Italy Japan Kazakhstan 
-63647.33 -43687.59 -43156.01 6539046.55 
Liberia Madagascar Mexico Nigeria 
-38213.56 -60598.95 -30608.26 -27653.66 
Paraguay Philippines Poland Romania 
-86314.10 -29371.28 -49067.03 -40878.05 
Rwanda Spain Switzerland Venezuela 
-72259.67 -46862.33 -54596.75 -22082.33 
Zimbabwe    
-75950.54    
 
 
(Table 7) F Test for Individual Effects 
Data: MNA ~ system+finittrm+housesys+sensys+tensys+checks+ … 
F=4.2549, df1=27, df2=188, p-value=1.496e-09 
Alternative hypothesis significant effects 
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(Table 8) Democracy 
Coefficients:     
 Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
Democracy (Fixed) 1298.46 440.46 2.948 0.003243** 
Democracy 
(Random) 
1466.665 433.051 3.3868 0.0007227*** 
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